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Share System: Toward Enterprise Reform ln the PRC 
Abstract 
Share system reform is a measure to specify the property 
rights and separate government from enterprise management. It 
provides a direction for PRC's enterprise reform, and is 
expected to rationalize the behaviour of enterprises under 
hard budget constraints. But there exist some problems in 
applying share system to achieve the intended purposes. The 
government is still the owner of the state assets. So a way to 
liberalize enterprises from government administrative control 




The management in China's traditional state enterprises 
1S administrative, heavily controlled by the government. It 
has led to the inefficient operation of state enterprises. 
Kornai (1980) coined the concept of "soft budget 
constraint" to describe the relaxation of budget 1n state 
enterprises, and Kornai (1986) pointed out that the 
combination of government and enterprises was the origin of 
the inefficiency. 
In as early as 1986, PRC's scholars recognised the idea 
that share system might be the right way to achieve enterprise 
reform. Han (1986) and Liu (1986) emphasized that state 
shareholding might separate ownership from management. 
From 1986 to early 1989, after detailed analyses of the 
enterprise reform, many researchers and practitioners 
advocated the share system proposal. Dong (1988), Hua & Zhang 
& Ruo (1988), Tang (1988), Zhang (1989) probed deeply into the 
feasibility of the transplantation of share system with public 
ownership. By applying western theory of property rights to 
analyze the share system, they pointed out that there existed 
an ambiguous property rights relationship in state 
enterprises. So they advocated the share system because it 
would specify the property rights. 
The "June 4th event" left people to retrospect on the 
4 
ten-year reform. And from mid-1990, more and more people have 
stood up to support the adaption of share system. Song (1990) 
pointed out that it was time to transform the traditional 
public ownership. 
Meanwhile, there was a movement for privatization in 
capitalist countries. Lord (1990), and Moore (1992) summarized 
the reasons for privatization, i.e. the discard of state 
enterprises: 1. encourage efficiency and effectiveness, 2. 
ralse capital, 3. widen the capital market, 4. promote 
competition,S. freedom in decision-making, 6. set up market 
culture. They pointed out that the most serious disadvantage 
of state enterprises was the subordination of commercial 
qbjectives to the political process. 
In- this article, I apply the elements drawn from the 
agency theory, from the theory of property rights and - from 
Marx's historical materialism to analyze the PRC's state 
enterprises. 
Then, I discuss the role of share system ln the 
transfor-mation of management mechanism in state enterprises. 
Finally, with a case analysis of one of the earliest joint-
stock enterprise- -Shanghai Feilo Company Ltd, I inquire into 
the problems which occurred in the transplantation of share 
system and try to find out feasible countermeasures. 
'--Eisenhardt (1989) reviewed the agency theory and 
indicated that the theory is concerned with resolving problems 
that occur in principal-agent relationships. The theory stated 
two important concepts: 1 . the "inherent goal conflicts" 
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between the principal and the agent, 2. the "governance 
mechanisms", which should be designed to limit the agent's 
self-serving behaviour. 
The agency theory 1S applied in this paper to analyze 
the principal (government) - agent (managers) relationship and 
the behaviour of managers in state enterprises. 
Siegel & Rammauskas-Marconi (1990) defined the concept 
of "slacks" as the difference between the resources that are 
actually necessary to efficiently complete a task and the 
larger amount of resources that are earmarked for the task. 
Among PRC's state enterprises, there exists serious 
management shirking and slacks, and, the only governance 
mechanism is the bureaucratic administration. These problems 
can be attributed to the combination of state apparatus and 
the government ownership of state assets. 
Marx 1n his famous book "Capital A critique of 
political economy" indicated.that the socialist society should 
gl ve the producer " individual property based on the 
acquisitions of the capitalist era" (P837) and there should be 
a distinction between the economic foundation (enterprises) 
and the superstructure (government). 
Coase (1937 , 1960), Alchain (1972) and Demsetz (1988) 
indicated the importance of the specification of property 
rights to allocate rewards and costs properly and reasonably. 
Thus share system, which can make the separation of 
ownership from control, 1S recommended and introduced to state 
enterprises to specify the property rights and reward 
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allocations. 
In order to have an idea of the actual application of 
share system in PRC, I will also investigate one large joint-
stock company - Shanghai Feilo Co. Ltd. - based on interviews 
with its general manager. In sofar as the share system reform 
1n PRC state enterprises, its most important intended purpose 
on the separation of government (superstructure) and 
enterprise has not yet been achieved. To ensure the success of 
share system reform, it 1S recommended to set up a pure 
economic institution state assets investing company, to be 
directly under the National Congress, purposes to ultimately 




China's state enterprises and their management 
2.1. The operation of the state enterprise system 
According to the traditional theory of socialism, l. e. 
in a society of public ownership, all social productive 
materials should belong to the people as a whole, so that no 
particular person can own any particular property except 
consumer goods. Since the people as a whole form the state, 
thus public ownership appears in the form of state ownership. 
Theoretically, state ownership can represent public 
ownership; but practically, "state" is the government and the 
public assets are finally managed by those bureaucrats in the 
government. In this alienation, "state", which is comprised of 
all citizens, lS replaced by the government, which lS an 
external organ to every citizen. Citizens glve up the 
management rights of public assets to the bureaucrats but 
without gaining in return any direct measures to monitor them. 
What constrains the management of the bureaucrats is the 
planned production targets set by their immediate superiors. 
Each year, the Central Planning Committee assigns production 
targets of every industry to each provincial local 
government. The local government then decomposes tEose targets 
to every bureau. A bureau is responsible for the production of 
products of one specific industry. Then each bureau assigns 
targets to each company. A company is responsible for the 
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production of a serles of products In one industry. And at 
last, each company places production targets to each factory, 
which is the basic production unit in China as elsewhere. 
Thus, what a manager of a factory does is to meet the 
production target without paying much attention to the market. 
And this leads to an economy which is "quantity first, quality 
second" . The government replaces market with a central 
planning system. This top-down operational system pre-supposes 
precise prediction of the productivity of both labour and 
machine In each industry and planners are charged wi th an 
almost impossible task of estimating the exact demand of 
consumers for each product. The most typical characteristic of 
the traditional state enterprises is the lack of independent 
economlc target and benefit. All decisions of input and output 
are made by different levels of government through planning 
departments and the enterprise's supervisory institutions. 
Moore (1992) pointed out the most serlOUS problem of 
state enterprises as political priorities took precedence over 
commercial ones. State ownership of industry means a 
subordination of commercial objectives to the political 
process. Lord (1990) also indicated political interferences in 
decision-makings of state enterprises. 
The highly centralized planning system turns state 
, ; ..... . 
enterprises into subsidiaries of the government while the 
daily operation of those enterprises is accomplished through 
administrative orders via the secretary of the Party Committee 
of each enterprise. Accordingly, the division-responsibility 
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system, held by the Party Committee, 1S implemented 1n those 
enterprises. The secretary of the Party Committee of each 
enterprise 1S the highest position in an enterprise and the 
manager is but an executor of the decisions made by the 
Committee. In essence, this fully represents a long-held 
\ 
principle 1n the Chinese Communist Party: the Party should 
lead everything. 
If people were machines, it might be plausible to run 
such a system. But unfortunately or fortunately rather, there 
are too many uncertainties which make the centrally planned 
economy inefficient. 
2.2. Agent problems in the management of state enterprises 
Public ownership has degenerated into state ownership, 
then into government ownership, and finally into party 
ownership. The ultimate "principals" of the public assets - in 
the terminology of the Agency Theory - are all the citizens, 
but they have become nominal, whereas, their real property 
rights have been emptied. The representative of the principal 
is the government. So the government sets up a direct agent 
relationship with the managers. As "agents" of all the 
citizens, bureaucrats at different levels of the government 
control and "own" the management right of public assets. 
In fact, there are two levels of agent relatlonship in 
this system. At the first level, the government acts as the 
agent of the citizens, with the National Congress 1S the 
"governance mechanism" monitoring the government. At the 
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second level, the managers of state enterprises behave as 
agents of the government, and the bureaucratic administration 
is the only governance mechanism. In this paper, because of 
its relevance to state enterprises, 
discussion of the second level of 
agent relationships. 
I only c.oncentrate on the 
the above two mentioned 
2.2.1. Managers as agents of the government 
The salary level of a manager in state enterprises is 
set by the government according to his bureaucratic status, 
which in turn lS determined by the number of employees and the 
annual output of the enterprise. Thus, in order to ultimately 
increase his own benefits, a manager is stimulated to increase 
the Slze of his enterprise. 
The state takes all the profit of state enterprises. The 
managers have no residual claims, let alone to garner all the 
return from their efforts. Thus the managers are inclined to 
just meet average performance expectations to keep their 
positions. Meanwhile, they maximize their benefits by shirking 
their tasks, directing resources from the enterprise to their 
own use and pursuing goals such as organizational Slze 
expansion which enhance their bureaucratic status and enlarge 
their _personal powers. Later, with the analysis of "soft 
budget constraints", I shall show that such expansions are at 
the -- expense of the welfare of the principals--the state. This 
fully reflects the "inherent goal conflicts" between the 
principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In socialist state enterprises, there's no economic 
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monitor mechanism to prevent such kind of shirking. There is 
only one political monitor mechanism bureaucratic 
administration. Each bureaucrat is only obedient to his 
superiors and his career path is to become . a bureaucrat of 
higher level. The bureaucrat's performance is evaluated by the 
accomplishment of the planned target assigned to him. So In 
order to meet the target more easy, managers (bureaucrats) of 
each level intend to add slacks as many as possible through 
various ways. 
Slack is the difference between the resources that are 
actually necessary to efficiently complete a task and the 
larger amount of resources that are earmarked for the task. 
The bureaucrats create slacks by underestimating revenues, 
overestimating costs, or overstating the amount of inputs 
necessary to manufacture a unit of output, in order to provide 
a safety margin to meet the production target. This cushion of 
extra resources relieves the target-related pressures and 
frustrations often induced by tight-targets. It glves the 
bureaucrats more flexibility and greater certainty of 
achieving their personal and organizational goals (Siegel & 
Rammauskas-Marconi, 1990). - In order to accomplish their work 
easily,- workers at the factory level do the same as their 
managers by adding slacks. 
Slacks are covered up through good personal relationship 
with immediate superiors and private benefit-sharing. Managers 
are supposed to be under the surveillance of the workers' 
congress In each enterprise. But since the workers' welfare is 
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linked to the accomplishment of the production target, workers 
In an enterprise likewise want to take advantages from the 
society and thus those managers who are most competent in 
bargaining production targets with superiors are the most 
popular. 
Therefore, political governance 
governance mechanism of the market 
replaces economic 
through competitive 
efficiency and production effectiveness. Slacks and 
inefficiency are of a massive scale in the production process 
of state enterprises, but are covered-up by personal 
relationship and private benefit-sharing In all levels of 
state enterprises. Slacks result in huge sum of wastes, 
significant inefficiency and low productivity In the 
production process. Slacks render meaningless budgets, 
production targets and performance standards. More 
importantly, slacks undermine the drive for organizational 
efficiency. To achieve organizational control, actual 
performances should be compared to reasonable standards. 
Without meaningful standards, no control can be implemented. 
2.3. Soft budget constraints 
Kornai coined the concept of "soft budget constraint" in 
his book "Economics of shortage" (1980). It describes the 
strict relationship between earnings and expenditure tha~ when 
state enterprises expect that excess expenditure will finally 
be paid by some other institutions, typically the state I in 
the form of "soft taxation", "soft subsidies", "soft prices" 
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and "soft credits", there occurs the relaxation of the budget 
(Kornai, 1980). 
Under the soft budget constraints, the operating loss of 
state enterprises may also be covered by external financial 
assistances, such as fiscal subsidies, low-priced raw material 
allocation, 
pricing and 
credits with lower interest rate, 
input allocation are subject 
etc. 
to 




There are two categories of implication for these soft 
budget constraints on state enterprises: ex ante and ex post. 
Ex ante implications: 
.First, state enterprises would care less about the price 
signals. Since the achievement of planned production targets 
has its priority, so as long as the enterprise meets the 
target, it can obtain various assistances from the government. 
It would care less about the possible financial outcomes of 
its decision makings. In fact, its decisions on input 
purchasing or investment are made in order to achieve the 
assigned production targets, not for the maximization of 
profit under binding constraints (Kornai, 1980). This kind of 
unconstrained behaviour further distorts relative prices and 
dis'turbs the working of the rational price system, including 
the pricing of capital. 
Second, there is exogeneity of the price system (Kornai, 
1980) such that the price level of inputs and outputs lS 
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determined by the government. Thus, when enterprises run into 
financial difficulties, they will try their best to affect 
their output prlce or input price through bargaining with 
state authorities . in charge of price controls. It is much 
easier to obtain profit through the bargaining than to improve 
operating efficiency. 
Third, because of the easy availability of external 
financial assistances, enterprises are subj ect to low levels 
of motivation to increase their efficiencies (Kornai,1986). 
Ex post implications: 
Government fiscal organizations intervene In the 
enterprise operation ex post with tax rate adjustments, 
subsidies, or even credits to correct some portion of 
allocation inefficiency of resources which results ' from the 
distorted price system and the soft budget constraints 
(Kornai, 1980, 1986) But, as we have discussed, the prlce 
distortion and the soft budget constraints are themselves 
resulted from the plan system and the availability of fiscal 
intervention. So it turns out to be a vicious cycle. 
Ex post fiscal intervention often involves bargaining 
because of the problem of information. By manipulating 
information reported to the state authorities, enterprises can 
affect determination of the tax, subsidies, or credit to their 
own advaritage, though '. not; necessarily to improve efficiency. 
Since the success o£ ·central planning system relies heavily on 
the timely and correct information, this information 
manipulation and time l.ag eve,ntually l 'ead to inadequate plans 
: . . . . 
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and distorted prlce system. 
State authorities, especially local authorities, also 
have their own nonofficial interests. The bureaucrats, who are 
in charge of the allocation of subsidies and other financial 
assistances, can exchange their power for their own benefits. 
So they also involve into the bargaining their superiors to 
obtain a higher quota of those financial assistances. 
State enterprises are administered by the 
under the central planning system, thus the 
government 
lack of 
independent economlC target and benefit. There lS only one 
political "governance mechanism" to monitor the behaviour of 
the managers. This distorts their behaviour and makes the 
managers choose a higher bureaucratic status as their career 
path. Thus, without economlC "governance mechanism", the 
-government can not solve the problems of slacks, shirking and 
soft budget constraints. 
In order to set up an economic "governance mechanism", 
we should first probe deeply into the origin of the 
inefficient operation of the state enterprises. 
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CHAPTER III 
Property rights and the origin of inefficiency 
3.1. Enterprises and government apparatus 
The traditional state enterprises have two important 
features: 
1. Their purpose is to achieve both economic and 
noneconomic goals. That is, the state enterprises should help 
the government to provide employment, maintain social 
stability, etc. 
2 . Their performances are evaluated not only by the 
magnitude of its profit, but also by their political and 
economlc relationships with- the external environments: the 
goverl1ment, the community and etc. 
These two features r~flect a unification in functions of 
both the enterprises and thegoyernment apparatus. This uneasy 
unification originates from ~ the ambiguous property rights 
relationship between the stat~ , and the enterprises. It 
eventually leads to persistent slac~~ and shirking due to soft 
budget constraint, and inefficierit - administrative control. 
This functional unification bet-ween the government apparatus 
and state enterprises breeches Marxism. ' '_ 
According to Marx' s historica+ ,_mat,erialism-~ the economic 
- foundation of a society is the - totaliJ:y ':' of relations of -
proquction appropriate toa given stag~ - : l'~ , the- :'development of 
material forces _ of production." A legal -and - political 
... ... " .. 
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superstructure arlses on, and definite forms of social 
consciousness correspond to this economic foundation. 
Accordingly, there should be a necessary distinction between 
this economic foundation and the superstructure (including the 
state, the government) (Marx, 1906). 
The traditional state ownership system implies that the 
state lS the subject of both the superstructure and the 
economlC foundation, and that the state apparatus replaces the 
internal law of motion of the economic foundation. The economy 
is "administered" by the state apparatus, and the market is 
replaced by the central plan (Hua, Zhang and Ruo, 1988). 
Moreover, according to Marxism, relations of production 
should be determined by the development of social productive 
.forces. But in traditional state ownership, the relations of 
production are determined arbitrarily by demands of the state 
administrative structure. This turns Marxism up-side down. 
Thus, the administrative methods used in the operation 
of the government are transplanted to the management of the 
economy and enterprises. This state adminstration of the 
economy cuts voluntary horizontal relationships among 
enterprises, and instead imposes a vertical planning system. 
As a result, inter- and intra-enterprise economic 
relationships are replaced by a strict bureaucratic 
relationship, and enterprises become the property of 
the state supervlsory government institutions. Moreover, 
apparatus (part of the superstructure) lS contaminated by 
commercialism, owing to its direct involvement in the 
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management of the economy. corruptions prevail with the 
exchange of bureaucratic power for monetary benefits. 
So the origin of the inefficiency of Chinese economy 
lies in the inadequate form of public ownership. 
3.2. Specification of property rights 
In his famous book "Capital A critique of political 
economy", Karl Marx wrote: 
"The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist 
mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is 
the first negation of individual private property, as founded on 
the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, 
with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is 
the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private 
property for the producer, but gives him individual property based 
on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i. e., on co-operation 
and the possession in common of the land and of the means of 
production." (P837, 1906) 
What does it mean? Perhaps an analysis of state 
enterprises with property rights theory may shed some light on 
it. 
Coase (1937, 1960 ) indicated the importance of the 
specification and arrangement of property rights In economy. 
The specification of individual property rights determines how 
costs and rewards will be allocated among the members of an 
organization through contracts. Pryor (1972) defines property 
rights as "a bundle of rights or a set of relations between 
people with regard to some good, services, or 'thing'i such 
rights must have economic value and must be enforced in some 
societally recognized manner". 
Property rights are a social means to help social 
individuals form their expectations about how they get 
benefits from and pay expenses for the use of property. So 
19 
there exists a close relationship between property rights and 
externalities (Alchain 1972). Property rights clarify the 
economic relationship among 




and provide guiding 
internalization of 
In order to internalize the external costs and benefits, 
a society should guarantee the establishment of ownership and 
a property right adjustment. The clarification of property 
rights makes the reasonable exchange of property available and 
forms the market (Demsetz, 1988). 
Tang (1988) pointed out that the property rights of the 
traditional public ownership were ambiguous and there was a 
need to specify the property rights. He indicated that · the 
specification of the property rights would secure: 1. 
investment efficiency principle to owners, 2. asset 
appreciation principle to managers, 3. contribution and 
distribution principle to labours. 
Public ownership means a right which can be exercised by 
all members of the public. It denies to the state or to 
individual citizens to interfere with any person's exercise of 
publicly owned rights. The soft budget constraint in state 
enterprises, however, reflects that there lacks a mechanism to 
concentrate the cost associated with any person's exercise of 
his public right on that person. 
If a person seeks to maximize the value of his public 
rights, he will tend to overuse the public assets because some 
of the costs of his behaviour are borne by others. Public 
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property results ln great externalities. It rules out the 
"pay-to-use-the-property" principle. Also, every owner of a 
public asset can not exclude others from enjoying the fruits 
of his efforts. This is the widespread free-riding phenomenon 
ln state enterprises. 
3.3. Institutional arrangement 
In modern enterprises, various types of human and 
material resources cooperate to produce products. And the 
means of production of enterprises is in common possession and 
not only belongs to one person. This 1S a team production 
(Demsetz, 1988). It becomes a problem how to reward and induce 
the members of a team to work efficiently without shirking. 
This is the concept of "governance mechanisms" of the agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). If it were costless to detect 
shirking, no member would have an incentive to shirk because 
nobody could impose the cost of his shirking onto the others. 
Based on the cost-efficient principle, ln each 
enterprise, only a certain level of efforts will be made to 
equate the marginal gains (efficiency improvement from the 
avoidance of shirking) of detection activity to the marginal 
costs of detection. 
One method of reducing shirking is to appoint someone to 
specialize as a monitor to check the -rnput performance of team 
members. But who will monitor the monitor? Constraints on the 
monitors are the market competition offered by other potential 
monitors and the tltle given to him to receive any residual 
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monitors and the title given to him to receive any residual 
product above prescribed amounts. 
Zhang (1989) addressed that institutional arrangement is 
the way to solve the problems of shirking, . free-riding and 
other moral hazards. After analyzing the share systems in both 
capitalist and socialist economies, he proposed that the 
communal institution, which incorporated the residual claims 
and the monitor power, was an adequate form for socialist 
enterprises. It represents . a prevailing idea of the 
feasibility of the adaption of share system to the socialist 
economy. 
But there lS still a problem. With the communal 
institutional arrangement, state enterprises are owned by the 
employees and that all share in the residual. Such general 
sharing ln the residual results ln losses from enhanced 
shirking by the monitor that exceed the gains from reducing 
shirking by residual-sharing employees. The communal 
institutional arrangement at last will lead state enterprises 
to the weak social ownership of the former Yugoslavia. 
If in a socialist society, the introduction of share 
system gives each producer- individual property (just as Marx 
suggested), then the general sharing of the residual will be 
replaced by specific sharing. And the property rights holders 
of the enterprise can organize together and set up mechariisms 
to moni tor the problem of management shirking and prevent 
outsiders from sharing the residual. 
Mester (1989) listed three ways to monitor the 
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management: 
stocks, 2 . 
1. 
by 
by encouraging directors 
incre.asing the power of 
and managers to own 
outside directors to 
remove managers, 
takeovers. 
and 3. by decreasing the barriers to 
Thus theoretically, the share system which clarifies the 
property rights, may be an adequate form of public ownership 
in socialist society. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A Review on PRC's Enterprise Reform 
Hua, Zhang and Ruo (1988) gave a detailed elaboration of 
PRC's enterprise reform with an emphasis on the criticism of 
the traditional public ownership and asked for new theories to 
direct the reform. In this paper, I stress the manager-
supervlsory institution relationship, since this relationship 
reflects the underlining property rights relationship. 
4.1. The reconstruction of labour ownership 
The experience of more than thirty years indicated that 
without external market competition pressure and internal 
incentive mechanism, the traditional state enterprises had 
operated inefficiently and the allocation of resources had 
been unreasonable. 
The Chinese government has been implementing an 
enterprise reform since 1979. At the very beginning, in 
following the Yugoslavian experiences, China emphasized the 
reconstruction of labour ownership, which allowed employees--
the owners of productive materials-- to manage the enterprise 
directly. It adopted the ' contract system and executed the 
policy of expanding enterprises ;-""autonomy. It also carried out 
various economic responsibility systems and established the 
manager responsibility system. 
However, under the soft budget constraints, the transfer 
24 
of power to lower level personnel caused an unreasonable 
expansion of enterprise investments and consumption funds. The 
retention funds of enterprises were increased at the expense 
of the decreases in the fiscal income. Moreover, the 
determination process of contracted profit again depended on 
the bargaining power of managers rather than on a scientific 
evaluation of the production potential of the enterprise. Thus 
the inequality among enterprises became much more acute. 
From 1983 to 1984, the government adopted a new policy 
by levying various taxes on enterprises instead of taking over 
a certain amount of profits from enterprises. But there were 
still problems. Although the income tax rate for all state 
enterprises was identical at 55%, the adjustment tax rate was 
determined separately for different enterprises. Even In the 
same industry, different enterprises had different rates. 
Thus, such a tax system had intrinsic defects and the rate was 
determined through bargaining, manipulation of information and 
some under-table behaviours. 
The logic of the reconstruction of labour ownership by 
taking each enterprise as a unit, is to achieve the 
unification of ownership . and management. However, with 
increased power In making decisions of production, profit 
distribution and etc, the workers payed no attention to the 
value increase of the state assets. Instead, they just wanted 
to change the state assets into their individual assets. 
Salaries and other welfare expenses were kept at a high 
ins:reasing rate at the expense of profit, development and 
" , '. " 
technological innovation funds decreases. Since the workers 
knew that if the enterprise ran into troubles, the government 
would save it through various measures, thus they could take 
advantage from other people of the country. 
In the fourth quarter of 1984, there appeared rapid 
expansion of investment and consumption and the macroeconomic 
was out of control (Zhao, 1985). 
It's quite obvious that the labour ownership system 
can't solve the problem of low efficiency caused by the 
ambiguity of public ownership. The government launched the 
"manager reform". 
4.2. The manager reform 
In 1985, the government shifted 
reconstruction of the micro incentive 
its emphasis to 
system by asking 
the 
the 
managers to be responsible for the efficient use of the state 
assets. It intended to launch a "manager reform" within state 
enterprises. Systems of leasing, contracting and asset-
management responsibility have been implemented. The 
government reduced administrative intervention on state 
enterprises while strengthening the manager's position and 
power In the enterprise. To ensure efficient use of state 
assets through providing incentives to the managers, the 
government asked managers to slgn contracts with their 
supervisory institutions to guarantee the achievement of a 
certain level of annual profit. If a manager failed to meet 
the target, he would be fined or fired; if he succeeded, he 
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would be awarded a certain percentage of the extra profit. 
However, this lurks possibility of the return of the 
former system. Since profit contract lS signed between the 
enterprise and its supervisory administrative institutions, 
thus it lS still administrative intervention by the 
government. 
The lack of competition mechanism In contracting, the 
assessment targets and the additional requisites set by the 
supervisory institutes further strengthen administrative 
interventions. The functional unification of the government 
and enterprises has been restored and even deepened (Hua, 
Zhang and Ruo, 1988). 
4.3. Some outcomes of the delegation 
Before the reform, all profits were taken away by the 
state. After the enterprise reform, enterprises can retain a 
part of profit. So the rate of profit retention (RT) indicates 
the profit distribution power of the enterprises. 
Before the reform, the total amount of output was 
instructed and assigned by the supervisory institutions. After 
the enterprise reform, the enterprises' output consists of two 
parts: the instructed and the market determined output. So the 
degree of marketization (M) indicates enterprises' power In 
de~~rmining the output level. 
There is a statistical analysis indicating that the 
composit~ factor productivity E of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function "has declined from 0.53 In 1981 to -0.22 In 1987, 
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while the enterprises' autonomy has been increased (Dong; Tang 
1992) . 
From Table 1, we know that RT doubled from 16.54% In 
1980 to 34.17% in 1987, and M increased from . 50.76 in 1985 to 
55.88 in 1987. These indicate that enterprises got more and 
more autonomy. But the composite factor productivity E kept 
decreasing from 0.53 in 1981 down to -0.22 In 1987. These 
results indicate a negative relationship between enterprise 
autonomy and productivity. 
Table 1 Autonomy and Productivity 
RT (% ) M ( %) s (% ) E 
1980 16.54 - - - -- - - - -- - - --
1981 - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- 0.53 
1982 - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- 0.50 
1983 21.81 - - - -- - - - -- 0.25 
1984 23.47 - - - -- - - - -- -0.46 
1985 28.39 50.76 37.34 0.36 
1986 32.58 53.58 40.98 -0.18 
1987 34.17 55.88 42.90 -0.22 
RT: the rate of profit retention = Profit retended / Gross 
Profit 
M: the degree of marketization = 1 - Instructed output / 
total output 
s: compound index of autonomy = 0.4M + 0.6RT 
Sources: "State enterprises -reform: institutions and 
efficiency" (Page 2, Page 4) (Dong; Tang 1992) 
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CHAPTER V 
Share system: a prospect future 
5.1. To liberalize the economic foundation 
Up till now, despite the introduction of market-driven 
reform efforts through the contract system (including the 
reduction of instructed production proportion and the 
relaxation of prlce control), state enterprises are still 
under the informal control of state authorities and depend on 
both the market and the state. The enterprises still tend to 
have a weak interest in enhancing economic efficiency. 
As mentioned before, decentralization of decision making 
even through market-driven mechanisms is of little use under 
the condition of a'distorted price system and the soft budget 
. constraints. The future of state enterprise reforms depends on 
reforming both the firm's budget constraints and market 
mechanisms. 
Initial enterprise reform efforts In China were merely 
adjustments to the parameters set by the superstructure, that 
,lS, some form of -administrative decentralization. 
Nevertheless, the economic foundation still has not been 
liberalized from the grasp of the superstructure. 
Yahg ' (1988) stated that the contract system, the 
backboneof~he initial PRC's enterprise reform, did not 
. . .. 
transform.:' th'€: ,-"traditional ambiguous property rights system and 
failed to br~:~k ' ·,, ':the old distribution structure. He proposed 
.:, ' 
" .... . 
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that a share system could replace the contract system and to 
separate the macroeconomic adjustment function of the 
government from the state asset ownership. He also suggested 
that the earnlng function of state shares should be separated 
from the monitor function. 
But, In the following analysis, I will argue that the 
most important thing is to liberalize the economic foundation 
from the superstructure and to deny the government the 
governance of enterprises. 
By setting up a pure economic institution the state 
asset investment company, which lS independent on the 
government and reports only to the National Congress, and that 
the evaluation criteria of the company are related only to the 
increase rate of state assets value, then there is no need to 
separate the earning function from the monitor function. 
5.2. Share ownership system 
Share ownership has become respectable with the Chinese 
Communist Party almost by accident. In the post-1978 drive for 
economlC reform, agriculture blossomed with a new-found 
freedom for the peasants to make economic decisions under the 
contract system. And villages started to e'stablish township 
factories and transport firms, many of which were financed by 
cooperative shareholding, usually by members- of a clan or a 
group of friends. 
Along came the reform in cities with the introduction of 
contract system and market-oriented management ln state-
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enterprises. The appetite of state and collective enterprises 
for commercial borrowing was being intensified while 
traditional bank credit became more and more stringent because 
of the shortage of funds and the fear of idle funds. So, more 
and more enterprises throughout China were anxious to advance 
from sole reliance on bank loans to other forms of funding for 
their operations, such as financing directly from the public 
(Hua, Zhang and Ruo, 1988). 
The urban managers in the early 1980's watched the 
suburban share holding success enviously and made efforts to 
persuade local Communist Party into approvlng similar share 
ownership experiments in the towns and cities. 
With reference to the fact that In the Western 
industrial revolution, the limited liabilities company with 
share issues played · as 
and the "bottleneck" 
important a role as the 
of funds in the present 
steam engine 
reform, the 
government approved the share ownership experiment in 1984 to 
raise funds and to improve management and administration. 
5.2.1. Purposes of share system reform 
Liu (1986) pointed out the necessities for the adaption 
of share-holding system in. socialist economy, and he listed 
the roles of share system as three-folded: 1. rationalize the 
behaviour of state enterprises, i.e. get rid of the soft 
budget constraints, 2. separate the government from the daily 
management of enterprises, 3. prompt capital movements to 
increase capital efficiency. 
In 1991, the State Council stated that the purposes of 
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introducing shareholding system In China are as follows (Bank 
of Communication, 1992) 
1. To transform the management system In the existing 
state-enterprises with the . separation of sta.te ownership and 
the functions of the management. 
2. To tap new financial resources, to ralse construction 
funds, to change the consumption funds into production funds, 
to enhance the efficiency on the application of funds and to 
solve the financial bottleneck during the reform. 
3. To improve the rational flow of production factors so 
as to achieve the optimal allocation of limited social 
resources. 
4. To lncrease the profitability of the state-owned 
assets. Song (1990) . refuted the idea that share system was 
only good for ralslng capital. He indicated that a share 
system specifies the property rights and according ~o Marxism, 
it was the "transition point" from capitalism to socialism. So 
the share system was considered critical to the success of the 
reform. 
Share system lS viewed as a measure to clarify the 
property rights relationship in . China. It lS expected to 
transform the traditional property rights relationship, 
construct a competitive market in which enterpris~s are under 
"hard" budget constraints. Share system . also makes merger, 
takeover and bankruptcy available. · It facilitates efficient 
allocation and . usage . of social resources . . 
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5.2.2. Important factors in the application 
There are three interdependent factors ln carrylng out 
the share system policies: 
1 . Through the transformation of property rights into 
share system, the property relationship of state enterprises 
will be clarified. 
At present, due to inefficiency and the lack of capital 
market, the asset value of state enterprises is distorted and 
needs reevaluation according to their capital present value 
and real output potential. 
Based on the reevaluation, 
represented by share volume and 
kinds of shareholders: 
property rights can 
finally there appears 
be 
four 
A) Government holders: Shares are held by the government 
at different levels through investment companies. Dividends 
and capital gain consist of part of the fiscal income, so the 
government needs only care about the financial turnout and 
operational efficiency and effectiveness of the enterprises. 
B) Corporate holders: Various kinds of funds can be 
established. With the investment in capital market, dividends 
and capital gains can be used to carry out social securities 
affairs. 
C) Inter-enterprises holders: Through capital movement 
ln the market, the allocatiQn efficiency of capital can be 
enhanced and the industry structure can be improved. 
D) Individual holders: With their investment in the 
enterprises, individuals can participate in the management and 
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thus to monitor the operation indirectly. 
The clarification of the property rights relationship 
changes the pattern of power distribution of the management. 
Each shareholder knows how much interest . one has ln an 
enterprise. And with the combination and balance of different 
goals of different shareholders, enterprises will be 
liberalized from administrative management and become profit-
and market- oriented through efficient and effective 
operation. 
2. With the construction of a capital market, mergers, 
takeovers and bankruptcies will be carried out more publicly 
and more reasonably. It provides an objective evaluation for 
enterprises' assets and their operations. This is a critical 
measure of the efficient allocation of capital. 
3. With the establishment of state assets management 
institutions, such as the national investment companies, which 
are independent on the government and directly report to the 
National Congress, it will separate the superstructure 
completely from the economic foundation. 
5.2.3. Some steps of share system reform 
In order to improve the management of state-enterprises 
to set up a market-oriented economy and to enhance the social 
economic efficiency, the Chinese government has gradually not 
only transformed - some state-enterprises into joint - stock-
style, but also set 'upnew j6int-stock enterprises. 
. ~\ 
According to the . Stqte 'Commission for Restructuring the 
Economy (Zha.~g, 1992}; , there were about 3,220 experimental · 
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share-holding enterprises of various types at the end of 1991. 
Eighty-nine of them openly issued shares to society, and the 
total value of their equity amounted to 5.81 billion RMB yuan 
(US$1.06 billion). 
These 3,220 share-holding enterprises roughly come in 
three kinds: 
(1): Employees-held shares, a system working in 2,751 
enterprises. 
(2): In 380 enterprises, people from the outside legally 
buy shares. 
(3) The rest 89 companies sell shares on the open 
market. 
We can also divide these firms into two categories: 
(1): Floating shares to absorb social idle funds and 
establish new firms. All assets are from the floating, so the 
property title is clear and there is no need to appraise the 
original capital value. 
These firms enJoy sufficient managerial autonomy and can 
learn much from western limited liabilities companies to 
operate successfully in the market and they are 
constrained by the traditional administrative system. 
less 
(2): In order to improve the management of state-owned 
enterprises and solve problems incurred from the union of the 
state enterprises and"--"collective firms, the government has 
approved some companies to become joint - stock companies and 
assets from the state, the collective and the individuals are 
to be merged into an organic whole. 
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The original state-owned capital stock was converted 
into shares owned by the state and the capital received from 
public issue was treated as the incremental part of capital. 
"B" shares are also created as a special vehicle to 
allow foreigners to invest 






Chinese shares. They are 
be subscribed with foreign 
foreign corporations and 
The "B" share experiment lS tied to the reform of 
Chinese inefficient state enterprises. With the issue of liB" 
shares, an enterprise will be changed into a joint~venture. It 
lS expected that this conversion will expose Chinese managers 
to international accounting and business standards and will 
provide an incentive to improve management. 
It will also enhance the PRC's profile in international 
capital markets. Equity also represents a cheaper means of 
drawing in the much-needed funds while the risk is borne by 
foreign investors. 
But whether the foreign investors can have a vote In 
determining the board of directors of those companies which 
lssue B shares is still _ another problem. Otherwise, the 
introduction of western management will be delayed. 
Up until now, the reasons for the adaptation of share 
system and the intended plan of share system reform of China's 
government have been discussed theoretically. But how about 
the actual implementation and the achievement? What kinds of 
problems have been solved and what kinds of problems still 
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have not been sol ved by the share system? What kinds of new 
problems have been induced during the share system reform? 
With a case study, I intend to give brief answers to these 
problems and I hope that some insights of the adapt ion of the 
share system in China may be got. 
In the case study, I first point out the ambiguous 
property rights relationship existed in the company before 
share system reform, and its results. Then I address the 
process of the share system reform and indicate the actual 
achievements so far. Finally with a terse analysis of its 
financial outcomes and interviews with its general manager, I 
point out the reasons why there is still soft budget 




Case Study: Shanghai Feilo Company Limited 
6.1. Introduction: 
Feilo Company Limited mainly produces electric sound 
products, such as: Hi-Fi, earphonei and etc. It is the first 
company approved by the government to experiment share system 
in Shanghai. Its experience of share system is typical and the 
problems it has encountered during this transition are worth 
analyzing. It underwent three system reforms from 1980 to 
1987. 
1. In 1980, ln order to expand production capacity, the 
state-enterprise Shanghai 11th Radio Factory took over two 
collective enterprises of the same Bureau and set up Shanghai 
Feilo Electric Sound General Factory. After the takeover, the 
production was expanded, so did the profit. But there also 
appeared many problems. 
First, there is a disorder of the assets belonging 
relationship. It was really difficult to coordinate two 
different accounting systems, one was for state assets and the 
other for collective assets. Thus all finan,cial statements 
were prepared respectively and it was very hard to consolidate 
them Slnce the items and rules of two accounting systems were 
different. 
Second, there was a disorder of internal relationship. 
There were two corporates in one factory, one was for stat.e 
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assets and the other collective assets. And the supervisory 
institute administered these two corporates separately. Thus 
the disorder of internal management relationship was 
inevitable. 
Third, there lacked a formal profit distribution system. 
It was hard to coordinate the benefits of the state, the 
company (collective) and the employees. Employees belonged to 
two different distribution systems, one was for state 
employees and the other for collective employees. This led to 
an unfair remuneration system, which allowed those state 
employees take advantages from those collective employees. The 
enterprise lacked the ability of self-innovation and self-
development. Employees didn't share the benefits of the 
enterprise and had no impetus. 
2. In 1984, the separation of ownership and management 
was experimented. With the approval of the People's Bank of 
China, Shanghai Branch, Feilo Factory set up a subsidiary 
company--Shanghai Feilo Acoustic Company Limited through 




1984 to 1988, 
Compa,ny operated so 
its assets doubled. 
successfully that 
The Feilo factory 
learned that share system prompted the enterprise to 
participate into the market competition, operate by itself and 
be responsible for its own profits and losses. The property 
relationship was much more clarified. The administrative 
subordination and intervention were weakened and the decision 
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power belonged to the board of directors. The general manager 
was responsible for daily management. The enterprise faced the 
market directly and there was no planned production target. 
The company had large flexibility in operation. Every employee 
owned a certain number of shares and the interests of the 
employees and the company combined together. 
3. On September 3rd, 1987, Shanghai Feilo Electric Sound 
General Factory was transformed into share system and the 
Feilo Company Limited was founded. On September 8th, it 
offered public share issue and the company was listed on the 
Shanghai OTC trading centre on April 18th, 1988. 
6.2. The process of transforming the share system: 
1. Clarify the property relationship: 
a. The structure of share ownership: 
The company assets consists of state, corporate and 
individual shares. The state fund (including the reevaluated 
fixed assets and state allocated current funds) lS changed 
into state shares. The collective fund, together with 
investments from other companies, lS changed into corporate 
shares. The shares subscribed by employees and the public are 
individual shares. 
b. Evaluation of the assets: 
Through evaluation, the company separates the state 
assets and collective assets. 
First, ask the Municipal Fiscal Bureau and Municipal 
Accounting Agency to formulate the evaluation policy and 
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principles. 
Second, authorize the Accounting Agency to evaluate the 
assets. 
Third, according . to the evaluation results, the company 
determines the amount of state shares and corporate shares. 
c. Share lssue: 
Determine the 
corporates and the 
property, the total 
amount of 
pUblic. Through 
share value 1S 
investments from 
the recognition 
25 million yuan 
50%, corporate: 40%, individual: 10%). 




a. Regulate the profit distribution order: . First, pay 
income tax. Second, pay back the technology innovation credit. 
Third, pay the fund of major energy and transportation 
construction. Fourth, distribute the remained profit and 
divide it into production & development fund, employees 
welfare & reward fund, dividend & bonus fund, and bonus 
reserve fund. 
b. Implement tax system reform, separate tax from 
profit. First, delete the adjustment tax. Second, income tax 
rate drops from 55% to 35%,. Being the government, the state 
collects income tax from the company; being the owner of the 
state assets, it also receives dividends and bonuses. Thus the 
distribution relatIonship between company and the state is 
clarified. This can lead to the separation of administration 
function from the asset management function of the government, 
and it helps company to achieve the separation of ownership 
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from management. 
c. Change pay-credit-before-tax into pay-credit-after-
tax. 
When the company pays credit before tax, In fact, the 
state bears the main burden of paying credit. After the set - up 
of share ,system, the company should be responsible for its own 
investment, so the government regulates that it only can pay 
credit after tax. 
d. The distribution of after-tax profit is determined by 
the board of directors. 
3. Set up a management system wi th the "separation of two 
powers" : 
a. The obligations of shareholder conference are: first, 
discuss the annual report of the board; second, discuss the 
financial budget reports offered by the board. 
b. Set up the board of directors . It is the decision-
making institute. The directors from state and corporates are 
designated by those institutes. The directors from individual 
are designated through the negotiation between the company and 
the representatives of individual shareholders. The 
obligations are as following: 
First, it is responsible for the appreciation of the 
company's assets value ~ 
S~cbnd, it makes investment decisions. 
Third, 
profit's. 
it determines the distribution of after-tax 
Fourth, it hir~s and fires the general m~nager . 
. .. , ..... 
42 
c. Implement the general manager responsibility system. 
The general manager is the corporate of the company and is 
responsible for the production decision-making and daily 
management. He is under the direction of the board. 
6.3. Financial outcomes of the company: 
From the table, we can find a problem. During the low 
profit period (1989-1991), the company's scale (according to 
Assets) kept increasing at an annual rate of nearly 20%, but 
its equity kept decreasing at an annual rate of 5%. This means 
that in an adverse business environment, it still has impetus 
to expand its scale and relies more heavily on the credits. Is 
there still a soft budget constraint? 
Table 2 Performance of Feilo Co. Ltd. 
Unit: RMB M 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Face 21.01 21.01 21.01 21.01 48.66 
value of 
shares 
Assets - - -- 103.488 114.144 148.678 276.797 
Equity - - -- 26.518 25.26 24.281 181.214 
Profit 6.2 2.478 - 0.42 1.867 10.527 
After-tax 4.43 1.705 0.357 1.765 8.948 
profit 
Source: Annual reports of Feilo Co. Ltd. 
6.4. Problems of the new system: 
Based on the interview with its general manager, I find 
that the management system has retained the traditional state-
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enterprise model, with only limited adjustment. There's a 
sense of "the same old stuff with different label". 
a. Right now, the eight directors consist of those 
original enterprise's managers, the officials of its 
supervisory department and managers of other companies which 
hold this company's shares (based on the interview with Qin) . 
The management principle is to achieve a balance of different 
partner's power, so the decision-making power in the board is 
dispersed. 
b. There are too many directors and SlX directors from 
supervisory institutions and other companies are part-time, so 
the board exists in name only. The general manager, who 1S 
also the vice-chairman of the board, arrogates all powers. 
c. The officials from supervisory institutions take 
positions in the board. They are the representatives of the 
state shares and also are the managers' immediate superiors, 
thus the management 1S still under the administration 
intervention. And the managers' career path 1S still the 
bureaucratic status. Then there is a return to the traditional 
system and there still exists soft budget constraint. 
d. The representatives of other companies only behave on 
behalf of their companies' benefits and ask for high level of 
dividends and bonuses. This prompts the company to take short-
term actions and reduces the retention funds. From table 2, we 
see that the equity kept decreasing from 1989 to 1991. During 
that period, the company's business was not good, the profit 
kept dropping. But the dividend and bonus rate was 20% in 
44 
1988, 18.75% in 1989 and 12.5% in 1990. The increase of equity 
in 1992 is only due to the premium gained from the new stock 
1ssue. 
The company should have independent operational 
management power, but its administrative affairs are still 
under the control of its supervisory institutions. This kind 
of distorted internal management system makes the company lose 
independence in the management of daily management. 
For example, the nomination, transfer, check-up, rewards 
and penalties of the company's cadres are under the 
supervisory institutions' administration, the company cannot 
d~termine all those things by itself. 
In human resource management, the regulated number of 
employees 1S set by the Labour Bureau; 1n the salary 
management, the salary level should be referred to the 
supervisory institutions and the sum of salary should be 
allocated by the Labour Bureau. -
:' t; 
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CHAPTER - VII 
Conclusion 
The origin of inefficiency of state enterprises lies on 
the ambiguous property rights relationship of the traditional 
state ownership. Thus, in order to improve the operation of 
state enterprises, there is a need to specify the property 
rights and change traditional general sharing of residual into 
specific sharing. 
The share system reform is recommended to specify the 
property rights in PRC. With the introduction of share system, 
an economic "governance mechanism" can be set up to replace 
the traditional political one and separate the government from 
enterprises. 
The most important thing the joint-stock companies 
should deal with is how to use the huge amount of money from 
the share issue that is raised efficiently and reasonably. 
It's a true progress that the joint-stock companies now have 
their own responsibility .to formulate their own business 
strategies. 
Before the enterprise reform, state-enterprises just 
executed the policy set up by their supervisory companies or 
bureaus, so at present there is still a lack of experience ln 
developing business strategies. Compared with daily 
management, the ability of strategic management of joint-stock 
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companies 1S relatively weak. Meanwhile, because of the high 
speed of the transformation of share system, some companies 
found it difficult to find out the direction of their future 
development and stipulate their own strategies 111 a short 
time. Thus some companies adapt share system simply for 
raising more capital while the transformation of management 
from traditional state-enterprises to joint-stock companies 
has been neglected. 
There're · several common characteristics of the 
strategies of joint-stock companies: 
1. Similarity of investment direction. 
concentrate on the real estate market and 
Many companies 
the securities 
market, mainly stocks. 
2. Strategic diversification investment has occupied a 
high proportion. 
For example, the Feilo Company Limi ted invested more 
than seven million RMB yuan in 1992 in setting up one real 
estate company, one trading company, one taxi company, one 
department store, one fashion company and etc. 
3.Limited funds invested into technology development. 
Little has been allocated to technology development and 
companies' innovation so as to expand the production of the 
traditional products (Shanghai Security Weekly, 
1992.). Many joint-stock companies are manufacturers, 
seem . to . have little confidence in their industry 







As the case study indicates, there are still control 
from supervisory institutions. Conflicts with supervisory 
institutions are inevitable In daily management. Two steps 
should be taken to transform the management system: 
(1). Deny the government the governance of enterprises 
In order to solve problems related to those supervisory 
institutions, it is recommended: 
(a) . Completely change the supervisory management 
system. 
A specific joint-stock company assets investment company 
should be set up. It is an economlC entity with maln 
responsibility to assure that the state-assets can appreciate 
as quick as possible, at least in par with those collective 
and individual assets of joint-stock companles. That lS to 
say, the goal of supervlslon is to maximize the companies' 
long-term profits. 
state shares, the 
As the representative of the owner of the 
investment company is responsible for the 
appreciation of state assets. 
(b). Adopt the general manager responsibility system. A 
general manager responsibility system under the reference of 
the board of directors sho~ld be implemented to lmprove human 
resource management. The general manger should have the final 
, say In hiring and firing employees. And the company's 
employment and remuneration policy should be laid out by the 
company itself. The government should be hands off from all 
these management issues. The government could focus on 
managing the · economy through the use of macroeconomic 
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leverages. 
(B). Strengthen the function of the board of directors. 
In order to strengthen the decision-making power of the 
board: 
(a). There should not be any government political 
officials in the board, instead the state assets investment 
company which 
board. Thus, 
lS an economic entity 
a complete separation 
enterprise can be achieved. 
can send people to 
of the government 
the 
and 
(b). Set up the standing board of directors and adopt 
the system of two-level directors. 
(c). Clarify the interest mechanism of the board and 
relate it to the company's operational benefits, so as to 
strengthen the board's responsibility and ensure the long-term 
development of the company. 
(d). Invite experts who have no financial interest In 
the company to be consultants or non-executive directors. 
As to the future development of share system, Hang 
(1986) listed the coupling conditions for the adoption of the 
share system: 
1. a well-organized stock . market, 2. 
regulations and laws, 3. the use 
comprehensive economic 
of indirect means in 
government macroeconomic adjustment, 4. an open capital 
market,S. the set -up'''''' of state assets investing companies. 
Although the paper was published seven years ago, it 
still enlightens the direction of the share system reform. 
The adoption of a share system in socialist China is 
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unprecedent and a lot of improvements are desired. It has 
transformed enterprises into market-driven ones and is taking 
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